Assessment of USV Certification Requirements for COLREGS Compliance, Anti-Tamper, Environmental and General Safety by Wood, Brian P. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2020-10-14
Assessment of USV Certification
Requirements for COLREGS Compliance,
Anti-Tamper, Environmental and General Safety
Wood, Brian P.; Gallup, Shelley P.; Good, Charles; Davis,
Duane; MacKinnon, Douglas J.; Anderson, Chris;
Oberholtzer, Michell
Monterey, California.  Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/65881
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
1 
 
Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
Assessment of USV Certification 
Requirements for COLREGS Compliance, 
Anti-Tamper, Environmental and General 
Safety 
Part of the Naval Research Program (NRP) at the Naval Postgraduate School 
NRP-20-N279A 
 
Brian P. Wood, Principal Investigator & Thesis Advisor 
Dr. Shelley P. Gallup, Faculty participant 
CAPT Charles Good, USN, Faculty participant 
Dr. Duane Davis, Thesis Advisor 
Dr. Douglas J. MacKinnon, Thesis Advisor 
Chris Anderson, Master’s Student 
Michell Oberholtzer, Master’s Student 
 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 






Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Table	of	Contents	
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 4 
Background ......................................................................................................................... 5 
M/LUSV CONOPS Development Team ........................................................................ 5 
Fleet Forces Command M/LUSV Fleet CONOPS Task Message .............................. 5 
Student Thesis: Sensor component vulnerabilities and their effects on maneuvering 
medium unmanned surface vessels (MUSVs). ............................................................... 6 
Methodology. ...................................................................................................................... 8 
Analysis............................................................................................................................... 9 
COLREGS ...................................................................................................................... 9 
Testing ......................................................................................................................... 9 
Navigation Behaviors .................................................................................................. 9 
Surface Hazard Tracking. ......................................................................................... 10 
Other Behaviors ........................................................................................................ 10 
Security ......................................................................................................................... 11 
Physical Security (PS) ............................................................................................... 11 
In-Port Security ......................................................................................................... 12 
Communications/Network Resources (for armed security) ...................................... 13 
Cybersecurity ............................................................................................................ 13 
Crypto ....................................................................................................................... 14 
Data Transmission .................................................................................................... 14 
Safety ............................................................................................................................ 14 
USV Design. ............................................................................................................. 14 
Sea State. ................................................................................................................... 14 
Propulsion Drive Lines ............................................................................................. 14 
Electric generation capacity ...................................................................................... 14 
Definition of vital systems ........................................................................................ 15 
Manning .................................................................................................................... 15 
Maintenance .............................................................................................................. 15 
Icing .......................................................................................................................... 15 
Emergency Sortie ...................................................................................................... 15 
Other ............................................................................................................................. 15 
Autonomy Software Services ................................................................................... 15 
Command and Control/Communications ................................................................. 17 
3 
 
Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
CONOPS Demonstration .......................................................................................... 19 
CONOPS Demonstration Objectives ........................................................................ 20 
Key Capabilities for Analytical Analysis ................................................................. 20 
Pre-deployment Checks ............................................................................................ 21 
Weapons systems ...................................................................................................... 21 
Payloads .................................................................................................................... 21 
Training ..................................................................................................................... 21 
Specific Repetitive and Certification Exercises (RE and CE) .................................. 23 
Vessel Retrieval and Scuttle ..................................................................................... 24 
Habitability ............................................................................................................... 24 
Logistics .................................................................................................................... 25 
Findings and Recommendations ....................................................................................... 26 
References ......................................................................................................................... 26 
Appendix A. Acronyms .................................................................................................... 27 





Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Introduction	
 
There are no secrets to success. It is the result of preparation, hard work, and learning 
from failure. 
 -Colin Powell, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
 
The Navy’s family of Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV) needs rational, robust and 
repeatable certification criteria for Collision Regulation (COLREGS) compliance, anti-
tamper, environmental and general safety to ensure their readiness for worldwide 
operational employment. The Navy has no clear-cut guidance of determining whether an 
autonomous surface vessel is ready for deployment. Areas to be considered include 
COLREGS, physical and cyber security, and environmental/safety issues.  
 
Research Questions guiding this research effort guide the development of that checklist: 
1. What level, amount and rigor of testing are required to satisfy US and IMO 
standards relative to safe navigation at sea (COLREGS)?  
2. What anti-tamper/cyber security measures may be employed aboard a vessel 
which may be boarded by unknown persons at sea?  
3. What degree of environmental and occupational safety measures should be 
reasonably met by a USV compared to a manned vessel of the same mission? 
 
US Fleet Forces Command is in the process of developing a CONOPS for both Medium 
and Large USVs (M/LUSVs). Information from the draft version of that document was 
used to examine other autonomous entities (i.e., M/LUSVs) have been (or are being) 
cleared for operational use. An unclassified autonomy certification checklist has been 
developed in the three primary areas (COLREGS, security, and safety) for use prior to 
deployment of USVs. A standing CONOPS Development Team (CDT) should be 
established to review and refine the checklist periodically. 
 
A master’s thesis from the Naval Postgraduate School examined how the Sea Hunter 
MUSV will react to degraded scenarios. Their research used the Autonomy, Validation, 
Introspection, and Assessment (AVIA) simulation environment and found that although 
Sea Hunter’s maneuvers were predominately COLREGS compliant, they did not 
consistently meet the standard of good seamanship. It also revealed significant 









Fleet	Forces	Command	M/LUSV	Fleet	CONOPS	Task	Message. On 10 December 2019, 
US Fleet Forces Command (USFF) issued an M/LUSV Fleet Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) Task Message which, in part, established a CONOPS Development Team 
(CDT) for the US Navy’s Medium and Large Unmanned Surface Vessels (M/LUSVs).   
 
The following are key parts of the USFF message:  
 
“Issue. MUSV and LUSV will be the Navy's first unmanned surface vehicle programs of 
record. The MUSV and LUSV programs will take a rapid, iterative, block approach to 
further develop, test, and employ new capabilities, aligned with the Surface Capability 
Evolution Plan (SCEP). MUSV will be a high endurance vessel with capacity for 
carrying various modular payloads. LUSV will be high endurance vessel equipped with 
Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells. MUSV will initially focus on intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) payloads and electronic warfare (EW) systems, 
while LUSV will focus on surface warfare (SUW) and strike missions. The fundamental 
capabilities of MUSV and LUSV may necessitate changes in how Carrier Strike 
Groups/Expeditionary Strike Groups and Surface Action Groups will conduct operations” 
[USFF].  
 
“Purpose. To facilitate the execution of the missions and capabilities of MUSV and 
LUSV, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific (CNSP) is directed to develop 
the MUSV and LUSV Fleet CONOPS” [USFF]. 
 
“Scope. The CONOPS will describe the capabilities at initial operating capability (IOC), 
the organization, manning, training, equipping, sustaining, and the introduction and 
operational integration of the MUSV and LUSV with individual afloat units as well as 
with Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary Strike Groups, and Surface Action Groups” 
[USFF]. 
 
“Action: Specific topics will be determined by the CONOPS Development Team (CDT) 
as appropriate to address operational and sustainment capabilities and employment at 
initial operational capability, as well as potential future capabilities. As a starting point, 
the CDT should consider the following areas:  
 
1. Identify and address anticipated integration and interoperability challenges for 
introduction with current Navy force structure.  
2. Identify and address challenges involved with the deployment and employment of 
MUSV and LUSV.  
3. Address command and control (C2), communications, computer, combat systems, 
and ISR processes and procedures.  
4. Present scenarios that illustrate the synchronization of capabilities to execution.  
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5. Identify future USV organizational structure, including basing, sustainment, and 
deployment concepts.  
6. Identify force development gaps and shortfalls impacting platform wholeness. 
Provide mitigation actions categorized in doctrine, organization, training, 
materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-
P) format.  
7. List assumptions, define the projected operating environment, and consider 
impacts to DOTMLPF-P.  
8. DOTMLPF-P specific paragraphs should detail considerations for current and 
future requirements to sustain the force” [USFF]. 
 
A kick-off meeting in late January 2020 formalized the CDT and established focus areas 
to be used in the CONOPS document. Due to COVID-19, the remainder of the work was 
conducted remotely. The CDT consisted of 100+ personnel from across the Navy and 
Department of Defense (military, civilians, contractors).  
 
Three faculty members from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, 
California were participants: Brian P. Wood, Dr. Shelley P. Gallup, and CAPT Charles P. 
Good, USN. Each contributed to the drafting of the final CONOPS.  The level of the 
document was determined to be SECRET/NOFORN however, much of the document’s 
content was at the Unclassified (UNCLAS) level.  As such, only UNCLAS or 
information is included in this document.  Of note, UCLAS/FOUO (for official use only) 
data was not included in this document. 
 
As of 14 October 2020, the Flag Officer Draft version of the CONOPS has been released 






Two students from the Naval Postgraduate School used the USV Certification research 
effort as a basis for their joint thesis. LT Christopher Anderson, USN and LT Michell 
Oberholtzer, USN used the Autonomy, Validation, Introspection, and Assessment 
(AVIA) simulation environment to determine how the Decision Engine of the Sea Hunter 
MUSV will react when confronted with degraded scenarios. AVIA was developed by the 
Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) for the US Government. Brian P. Wood and Dr. 
Duane Davis (NPS Faculty) acted as Thesis Advisors to the project. 
 
Evaluated scenarios included routine overtaking, crossing, and restricted maneuvering 
situations and adversarial situations in which malicious vessels attempted to force Sea 
Hunter into unwanted maneuvers. In addition, Sea Hunter’s reaction to degraded Global 
Positioning System (GPS) and malicious Automatic Identification System (AIS) track 
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Findings. Their findings revealed that although Sea Hunter’s maneuvers were 
predominately COLREGS compliant, they did not consistently meet the standard of good 
seamanship. Additionally, the thesis revealed significant vulnerabilities to the Sea Hunter 
that should be addressed prior to fleet integration.  
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Methodology.	
 
The research questions were concerned about how COLREGS, security, and safety were 
involved in the development of a checklist to determine if an autonomous USV is ready 
for deployment.  
 
Three NPS faculty members were participants in the CDT and contributed to various 
portions of the draft CONOPS document. The draft CONOPS document would be culled 
for information suitable to be used in a checklist in each of the three areas (at the 
UNCLAS) level. Any classified information would not be incorporated or referenced. 
This document is considered to be the primary source for our research as it has inputs 
from the 100+ members (all Subject Matter Experts to some degree concerning USVs) of 
the M/LUSV CONOPS Development Team. 
 
Once the sections of the CONOPS were divided appropriately, the level of information 
would be reduced further to create a workable bulletized checklist for the topic sponsor 
(Commander, Surface Development Squadron ONE). 
 
Additional information for LT Anderson and LT Oberholtzer’s thesis would also be 
incorporated. Their goal was to identify potential weaknesses of USV components for 
future CONOPS and identify any current USV component flaws that can feed into future 
USV designs. 
 
Any material that did not fit into any of the three established categories would be put into 
a fourth one titled Other. These would be sub-categorized as necessary. 
 
Progress and interim findings were to be presented to the sponsor through quarterly 
Internal Progress Reviews (IPRs) via telecon. 
 
Final deliverables include the following: 
• Executive summary of the research effort 
• Poster for display at NRWG 21 (April 2021) and for use by the sponsor with a 
summary of findings 
• LT Anderson/LT Oberholtzer Thesis (completed June 2020) 
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Analysis	
 
The following sections display bulletized checklists for USV Certification in the areas of 
COLREGS, Security, Safety, and Other areas. The first three are specified by the 
Research Questions for our effort and the fourth is a catch-all for items outside the scope 
of the other three.  Some items cross over between two of the categories and are listed as 





• Has the USV undergone testing in the following areas? 
o Range at end speed and sustained speeds (MUSV 3500nm @16 & 24 
knots) 
o Sea State 
§ Max operations (M/LUSV SS5) 
§ Max survivability (M/LUSV SS7) 
o Speed 
§ Sprint 
§ Stationing (High, Medium, Low) 
§ Transit (x nm at y knots endurance and z knots sustained) 
§ Loiter (Low, Drift/0 knots) 
 
Navigation	Behaviors. Are the following behaviors defined so that they can be 
combined in nearly any sequence to perform longer, more complicated maneuvers? 
 
• Transit missions. Are Transit mission priorities determined by function of the 
higher-level mission planner (within mission management software mission 
management/arbitrator) to determine what behavior will be executed if there is a 
conflict in system goals? 
• Point Transit. USV shall navigate to a geographic coordinate and shall prioritize 
course to next waypoint vs. minimizing cross track error (XTE). Does a Point 
Transit command include mission parameters such as speed of advance, time to 
achieve next or final waypoint, latitude, longitude, and allowable distance error? 
• Track Transit. USV shall navigate to a geographic coordinate while minimizing 
cross track error (XTE). Does a Track Transit command include mission 
parameters such as speed of advance, time to achieve next or final waypoint, 
latitude, longitude, and cross track error tolerance? 
• Loiter. USV shall transit to a geographic coordinate and remain within a 
specified radius of it by acquiring, drifting, and re-acquiring the loiter geo 
coordinate. Does a Loiter command include mission parameters such as speed of 
advance, time to achieve next or final waypoint, latitude, longitude, loiter point 
capture radius, drift radius, and loiter duration? 
• Loiter with Heading (LWH) - USV shall transit to a geographic coordinate and 
remain within the specified (drift) radius of it. Does the USV maintain the drift 
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radius, heading, and loiter duration of a point by acquiring, drifting while 
maintaining heading (typically into the wind) as able, and re-acquiring the Loiter 
geo coordinate when necessary? 
• Hover – USV shall transit to a geographic coordinate, and then shall actively 
remain at that geographic coordinate to the best of its ability.  
o If a heading is specified, does the USV shall attempt to maintain that 
heading while hovering?  
o Does the USV adhere to mission parameters such as speed of advance, 
time to achieve next or final waypoint, latitude, longitude, hover point 
capture radius, heading (could be into wind), and hover duration?  
• All Stop – Is the USV effectively set adrift when it does not use any propulsion 
(mains neutral/idle, thrusters off) until further commanded? 
• Vector Control - USV will maneuver at a provided course and speed over ground 
(COG and SOG) as part of a planned or ad hoc mission as commanded.  
o If commanded outside a planned mission does the USV shall pause the 
current behavior and resume the paused behavior when Vector Control is 
ended? 
o If Vector Control is commanded by the offboard operator does the vector 
command take priority? 
 
Surface	Hazard	Tracking.		
• Is the data from the radar(s) and camera(s) camera(s) data fused/correlated to 
provide a single track for a surface hazard that may include information with a 
unique track ID, position, relative range and bearing, COG, SOG, and 
classification?  
• Can the USV provide tracks of the following sized vessels at the indicated ranges: 
o Large navigation buoys and small static or moving vessels (7M to <12M) 
from 2nm (or greater) and be held to within .05 NM (or less) from own-
ship position. 
o Medium vessels (12M to <50M) from 5nm (or greater) and be held to 
within 0.1nm (or less) from own-ship position. Large vessels (>50M) from 




Survival - USV places top priority on choosing best heading and speed to minimize 
damage while maneuvering out of storm conditions.  
• Is the USV capable of determining when the environmental conditions exceed 
operational conditions? 
o If so, will it pause and override existing behaviors, except for Collision 
Avoidance and avoiding shoal water, and notify the operator that the 
USV is in a Survival behavior? 
o Will the USV maneuver such as to minimize damage to the system? 
o Will the USV resume the paused behavior when environmental 




Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
Hazard	Avoidance	
• Is the USV capable of avoiding collisions with surface contacts at the 
minimum system specified standoff distance as specified in the USCG 
Standard for collision avoidance? 
o Note. The USV collision avoidance shall comply with USCG 
COMDTINST M16672.2D, Part B, Rules 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18 and 19.  
• Is the USV capable of configuring standoff distance by surface hazard types? 
o Types may be defined by size, moving or static, and constrained 
vessels.  
• Is the USV capable of selectively turning off collision avoidance in 




Security measures designed to protect unmanned maritime systems (UMS) from 
adversary exploitation are similar to those developed for manned systems. One of the 
fundamental differences is that UMS cannot rely on the actions of ship’s crew to enact an 
emergency action plan or carry out destruction and zeroization procedures. An unmanned 
maritime system may also be subject to capture, which carries with it a high risk of 
adversary exploitation. 
 
Physical	Security	(PS) is that part of security concerned with physical measures 
designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, 
installations, materiel, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, 
sabotage, damage, and theft. PS involves the total spectrum of procedures, facilities, 
equipment, and personnel employed to provide a secure environment.  
• Is the PS program designed and executed by the Immediate Superior in Command 
(ISIC) with assistance from the caretaker organization? 
• Does the PS program support the function of the anti-terrorism plan to deter, 
detect, delay, defend against, mitigate and recover from a terrorist attack? 
• Are mitigation strategies incorporated to prevent physical access to devices or 
connections to the platform's network and systems? 
• Upon detection of unauthorized attempts to breach the system physically, is the 
system capable of independently conducting zeroization of sensitive systems in 
the same way that a manned ship would conduct emergency destruction 
operations prior to abandoning ship? 
• Is there a plan to defend and ensure the platform (and included systems) 
availability, data confidentiality, integrity, and availability? 
• Based on indications, warnings and abnormal system behavior how will networks 
and systems adjust resources to complete the mission while ensuring data 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability? 
• Physical Security Requirements for Classified Material Spaces onboard USVs 
12 
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o Background #1: The USVs will have equipment located inside of the 
secure compartments that may require access by US Navy personnel while 
underway in order to execute troubleshooting or repairs. This 
troubleshooting and repair will be limited to restore the USV to mission 
capable status or to facilitate return to a port for more significant repair or 
maintenance activities. Current policy limits the distribution of physical 
keys and combinations to access classified material spaces to persons 
authorized by an access control list and mandates the changing of 
combinations upon the transfer of those individuals. The USVs will have 
no permanent crew assigned to them while underway and specific use 
cases may require maintenance technicians from a nearby ship to embark, 
access the spaces, and repair equipment without compromising the 
security of the compartments by damaging security mechanisms. 
o Action:  
§ What is the applicability of the policy to the USVs and modify if 
appropriate?  
§ If policy modification is not viable or desired, can redundancy of 
equipment be increased to achieve required operational availability 
to meet USV missions without the need to repair classified 
equipment while underway? 
 
o Background #2: Classified spaces onboard manned vessels require 
combination or physical lock security for magazines or information 
processing/storage spaces. USVs will require a different way of securing 
spaces to comply with physical security policy requirements while still 
supporting troubleshooting of equipment while underway without flying 
the authorized personnel or keys to the vessel or requiring changing 
combinations on locks as personnel or support vessels rotate assignment. 
o Action: What are the specific physical security requirements for classified 




• Has the ISIC in agreement with, and support of, the caretaker organization and 
host installation’s command security force designed a plan to provide a protective 
presence to: 
o deter crime 
o respond to calls for assistance, alarms, and reports of criminal activity 
o enforces laws, regulations, and directives in areas of the command’s 
jurisdiction? 
o Does the plan include a system for the daily after-hours checks of the 
vessel’s restricted areas, support facilities, and pier ingress and egress 
points to detect any deficiencies or violations of security standards?  
o Does the command’s Navy Security Force with emergency support from 
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OCONUS	
• Have in port security measures for OCONUS Unmanned Seaborne targets sites 
(Rota, Bahrain, Okinawa, Guam, Barking Sands) utilized resources and/or 
concepts from these locations? 
• Any small team assigned on board will be for force protection and navigating 
complex evolutions (entering and exiting port). Does the Host Nation, forward 
operating base security, and the controlling DDG or CG supply manned resources 
for OCONUS security? 
 
Communications/Network	Resources	(for	armed	security)	
• What is the notional baseline for LOS and BLOS communications (SHF and 
UHF? 
• Is the USV capable of LOS and BLOS communications on existing Navy 
networks? 
• Are communications channels secured using security measures required at the 
classification level of the information? 
 
Cybersecurity	
• Will the Information Technology and Mission Payloads onboard the USV 
platforms operate without direct operator action to patch or recover them in the 
event of tamper or failure? 
• Do USVs employ anti-tamper and security controls to preserve confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability? 
• What is the exact quantity of local area networks (LANs)? 
• What is their security classification? 
• Are automated Defensive Cyber Operations-Internal Defensive Measures (DCO-
IDM) required to recognize attempts to interfere with the operation of, or exploit 
the networks and systems.  
• Do the systems will constantly monitor the health of the platform and functional 
domain systems? 
• Will the system recognize identify anomalistic behaviors and perform necessary 
remediations with minimal intervention? 
• Does the system maintain a cybersecurity posture that is good enough throughout 
the mission to ensure a successful mission? 
• Security	patches. 
o Is a risk assessment conducted to determine if it is acceptable to avoid 
patching LANs on the USVs until they can return to port or are no longer 
on mission? 
o If it determined that the patching action will be implemented while at sea, 
are the patches verified and validated patches in a systems integration 
laboratory (SIL)? 
o Will the system be able to revert to the known-good-state in the event of a 




Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Crypto	
• Is the appropriate level of crypto aboard the USV? 
o Note. NSA policy at present prohibits placing Suite A crypto on 
unmanned platforms, but Suite B crypto is authorized. Suite A crypto is 
NSA encryption algorithms, and Suite B crypto is commercial encryption 
algorithms. Manned C2 nodes operate on Suite A crypto, while USVs will 
be on Suite B. Unless NSA policy changes, a facilitating communication 
directly between a C2 node and USVs would require changes to all C2 
nodes to provide additional encryption devices and Suite B crypto. 
• Have PMS 406 Cyber and C4I organizations developed a new system to enable 
automated crypto loading to various systems and devices to support the mission 
for: 
o periodic crypto rollover 
o changes in the operating theater that requires shift to a different crypto key 
(e.g., satellite rollover) 
o reloading systems that require reload after restart or upon initialization 
(e.g., tactical Tomahawk weapon control system for the integrated combat 
system (ICS)).  
o Have the above manual operations been automated for USVs? 
• For longer operating periods (e.g., 60 days) have changes in crypto and EKMS 
design including how operators handling keying material (KEYMAT) and crypto 
zeroization been made? 
 
Data	Transmission	








• What is the maximum sea state the USV is expected to survive? (M/LUSV SS7) 
• Is the USV’s hull designed to wave heights beyond what American Bureau of 
Shipping High Speed Naval Craft (ABS HSNC) alone would require?   
 
Propulsion	Drive	Lines	
• Does the USV have two independent main propulsion drive lines, he loss of any 
single drive line not inhibiting the craft from reaching its endurance speed?  
 
Electric	generation	capacity	
• Does the USV possess sufficient standby generator power to maintain the most 
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Definition	of	vital	systems	
• Are the vital systems onboard the USV in accordance with the American Board of 
Shipping (ABS) Essential Services? 
o Is there enough mission, mobility, and support services required to bring 
the vehicle home? 
• Is weapons systems employment possible? 
o If so, the USV vital systems will be treated as a combatant. 
 
Manning	
• Is there an optional pilot house with space for an appropriate amount of people? 
 
Maintenance	
• What is the maximum time between preventative maintenance events, threshold 
and objective)? (M/LUSV 30 and 60 days) 
• What organization is responsible for O-level and I-level repairs to the USV? 
 
Icing	
• Does the USV have a means to de-ice? 
 
Emergency	Sortie (Phase 1 Combat/Typhoon) 
Adverse or severe weather. The responsible party for the vessels while moored shall 
monitor naval base message traffic or local weather reporting stations (if not in a Navy-
controlled port) for weather warnings/reports for possible destructive weather conditions. 
Early notification to the vessels’ commanding officer or master is vital.  
 
• If no crew are aboard the USV, are procedures in place to activate standby duty 








• Human operator-defined mission plan. Does MM: 
o receive it from the control node? 
o decompose it into a scheduled set of activities? 
o execute the mission plan? 
• Software services coordination. Does MM coordinate with the software services 
within the USV ISR payload to: 
o enable changes in signature posture to support ISR missions? 
o command maneuvers needed to support USV payload activities? 
• Planning and coordination of other activities needed for MUSV health 
sustainment. Does MM handle automated maintenance, such that the activities 
do not interfere with mission execution {SAFETY} 
16 
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• Does MM provide priority levels to other software components, such as: 
o Sensor/Effector Management services, based on the overall mission plan? 
{COLREGS, SAFETY} 
• In situations with competing goals or activities, does MM act as an arbiter 
service to provide mediation of competing goals? {COLREGS, SAFETY} 
• Does MM handle dynamic planning of activities due to changes in 
environmental state that impact mission execution and health? {COLREGS, 
SAFETY}  




Does EO:  
• provide the interfaces to the machinery control system, engineering plant, and 
autopilot? {SAFETY} 
• monitor health and status of the major and auxiliary machinery systems and 
determine when automated maintenance processes are needed? (SAFETY} 
• provide engineering plant availability and maximum permissible speed based on 
engineering plant health states. This information is supplied to other Autonomy 
software components and to the control node? {COLREGS, SAFETY} 
• optimize plant loading and operation? {SAFETY} 
 
Communications	Operations	(CO)	
Does CO:  
• monitor and control the network and communications equipment, including the 
communications radios, modems, and antennas? {SAFETY} 
• monitor health and status of communications equipment and provides that 
information to the mission management software services? {SAFETY} 
• handle changing emission states of the communications equipment? {SAFETY} 
 
Sensor/Effector	Management	(SEM)	
Does SEM:  
• provide the interfaces for interaction between the USV payloads and the other 
autonomy software components, such as the mission management services? 
• provide health and status of payload systems? 
• request maneuvers of the USV? 
• receive commands and priority status from the mission management services? 
• Does each payload on the USV have its own SEM software? 
 
Maneuver	Operations	(MO)	
Does MO:  
• handle short distance navigation and motion planning? {COLREGS, SAFETY} 
• receives geographic destination information, operational locations, and keep-
in/keep-out zones from mission management services as well as locations and 
17 
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velocities of perceived contacts from the perception system, and uses this 
information to plan its maneuvers? {COLREGS, SAFETY} 
• Do the motion planning services within MO also handle adherence to COLREGs 




Resilient	C2. Resilient Command and Control (RC2) is accomplishing C2 when operating 
in a denied, degraded or exploitable environment. RC2 is a portfolio of systems; 
waveforms; TTP; operating models; and philosophies that enable C2 through a robust 
series of data paths. No single technology enables RC2 nor will RC2 provide the same 
capacity or capability in the most challenging of operating environments. In some cases, 
a minimal amount of mission critical information may be the only data to pass on RC2 
conduits while the routine health and status or administrative information will not be 
transmitted to or from the USV platform. Mission Critical information may include data 
such as discreet waypoints, or keep-out areas, payload employment instructions, mission 
acknowledgement, or abort instructions as the mission defines. 
• What is the USV’s RC2 plan? 
• Do the USVs will have sufficient C2, navigation, and timing system capabilities 
for denied, degraded, or exploitable environment (D2E2) operations? 
  
Ashore/Afloat	Common	Control	System	(CCS)	
• Does the CCS provide a communications capability and capacity to ensure 
delivery of mission critical information between USV and appropriate C2 node 
(ashore or afloat)? 
• Are the communications systems robust enough to enable RC2 through use of the 
maximal amount of the available RF spectrum within the constraints of the cost of 
the platform and policies regarding encryption on unmanned platforms? 
 
Beyond	Line	of	Sight	Communications	(BLOS):	
• Does the USV communications suite enable a satellite communications capability 
to a servicing NCTAMS or NCTS using a Commercial Broadband Satellite 
capability across suitable frequency bands (i.e. C-Band, Ka-Band, Ku-Band, etc.) 
to enable sufficient data throughput to enable data transfer to and from the 
platform? 
• Do these systems enable jam resistance and low probability of interception, 
detection, exploitation, and geolocation against potential adversaries? 
• Does the USV incorporate High Frequency IP  (HFIP) capability to serve as an 
additional Beyond Line-of-Sight communications path to add redundant 
communications paths that will also enable jam resistance and low probability of 
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Line	of	Sight	Communications:	
• Does the USV enable Link-16 (or other, e.g., Link-22 and Tactical Targeting 
Network Technology (TTNT)) communications for the primary Line-of-Sight 
communications path between the USV and a C2 platform? 
 
Extended	LOS	Communications	
• Does the USV have the ability to operate within Line of Sight (LOS) of an afloat 
manned unit (afloat USV Operations Center (UOC)) at some nominal distance 
(M/LUSV 20nm)?  
• Does the USV have both Direct and Extended LOS communication? 
• Extended LOS. Does the USV incorporate a system of extending LOS 
communications (such as the Communications Containerized Tethered Elevated 
Mast (Comms C-TEM))? 
o Will mission management of the extended LOS system work with the 
communications processer to determine which antenna to use and launch 
or recover Comms C-TEM as needed?  




• These systems used for ISR or hazard avoidance will need to be non-unique or 
else they risk identifying the ship as an MUSV; greatly reducing its ability to be 
used as proposed in the vignettes.  
• Are the USV situational awareness (SA) sensors capable of sensing the 
environment and providing actionable information to the system?  
o Will sensors such as radar and cameras be used for the purpose of 
detecting, tracking, and classifying surface hazards with respect to hazard 
avoidance? {COLREGS] 
o Will data from meteorological, depth, visibility, acoustic, and wave height 




• Will the C3S provide situational awareness (SA)/battlespace awareness (BA), as 
well as, provide an Automatic Identification System (AIS) that will provide 
SA/BA information for vessels operating in the vicinity of the USV? 
{COLREGS, SAFETY} 
• Is the C3S human readable while the vessel has personnel embarked for specific 
scenarios (e.g., piloting waters, sea and anchor detail, and underway 
replenishment)? {COLREGS, SAFETY} 
• Will the C3S provide a capability to transmit the USV’s position where 
operational security permits and prudent seamanship demands? {COLREGS, 
SAFETY}  
• Does the AIS system will provide input to the vessel's situational 
awareness/autonomy system to enhance understanding of shipping traffic and 
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provide an additional source of contact management data in the event of a 




• USV will require an ability to navigate, operate, and employ payloads that is 
predicated on accurate PNT information across all phases of conflict and across 
the spectrum of permissive and contested environments.  
• Can the USV systems provide an integrated PNT solution that incorporates GPS-
based PNT information augmented with inertial or other sources of navigational 
information that enable a redundant integrated PNT solution? 
• Is the PNT solution then distributed to onboard systems to support 
synchronization, pointing of sensors or antennae, and employment of the various 
payloads embarked on the platform? 
• Is the PNT solution aligned with existing Programs of Record to support 
diagnostics and troubleshooting without requiring additional training for sailors 
that might have to embark in order to troubleshoot, initialize, or repair the 
systems? 
• Is the PNT solution evolvable as new capabilities are fielded in the fleet to 




• Are there plans for transmitting fidelity and health status during times of limited 
bandwidth? 
o Note. One such solution may be to perform data analysis and signal 
processing onboard the USV prior to transmitting data (ISR&T, etc.) thus 
limiting the amount of data sent offboard. 
 
CONOPS	Demonstration	
CONOPS demonstration is an interactive process that promotes capability deliver, 
alignment, and integration with fleet operations. It is an essential step toward the 
introduction of USVs into the fleet. Demonstration opportunities may be used to 
formalize processes, procedures, tactics, or other interactions with supporting activities.  
 
• Are the following included as objectives of a demonstration? 
o Validate key assumptions or capabilities 
o Determine if recommended actions are appropriate and effective 
o Strive for safe and consistent execution 
o Achieve the desired effects 
• Have the following key concepts articulated in fleet CONOPS been demonstrated 
operationally? 
o modeling and simulation 
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o testing 
o exercises 
• Have the following venues been used to evaluate CONOPS demonstrations? 
o war games 
o exercises 
o lessons learned analysis 
o operator feedback 
o  would serve as the methods to 
 
CONOPS	Demonstration	Objectives	
• Have the following objectives been considered for a CONOPS Demonstration? 
o day/night autonomous operations from shore-based CCS architecture node 
o day/night autonomous operations from ship-based CCS architecture node 
o endurance test demonstrating capability to reliably operate underway in 
open ocean environment without requiring manned preventative 
maintenance or manned systems troubleshooting for threshold and 
objective days (M/LUSV 30 and 60) 
o High Sea State (HSS) testing demonstrating capability to reliably 
operate/survive in maximum Sea States (M/LUSV 5 and 7) 
o deploy, fly, and retrieve an organic unmanned tethered GFE aerial system 
to extend ISR capability 
o refuel at sea 
o autonomously executing missions including: 
§ navigation to ordered areas 
§ preparation and activation/deactivation of installed payloads 
§ responding to changes in the Common Operational Picture (COP). 
o autonomously navigate, maintain situational and self-awareness, respond 
to dynamic environmental conditions, internal system faults, and avoid 
obstacles This includes complying with the International Rules of the 
Road {COLREGS} utilizing appropriate sensor inputs to include but not 
limited to: radar, AIS, INS, GPS, camera systems, acoustic, and other 
means of sensing. 
o safe autonomous navigation in low visibility and foul weather 
environments {COLREGS, SAFETY} 
o transiting to a forward operating area, mission execution, data collection, 
egress, and transit back to a forward deployed base 
o embarking/disembarking personnel up to Sea State 3 in support of sea and 
anchor detail, fueling at sea, and emergency repairs or towing preparations 
o continuing autonomous operations in a communications constrained or 
GPS denied environment 
 
Key	Capabilities	for	Analytical	Analysis	
Have the following key capabilities during the validation of this CONOPS been reviewed 
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• command and detachment personnel employment practices required to 
accommodate USV operations 
• nighttime operations 
• Manpower, training, and equipment needed for all players in the process (USV 
CCS operators, maintenance personnel, watch officers)  
• Maintenance skills, equipment, and supplies needed to reside on the shore 
detachment and fly away team pack-up kit (PUK).  
• Skills, equipment, and supplies that need to be flown to the USV forward 
operating base should the USV break down in the OPAREA. 
• Length of time a USV can be expected to be down to accomplish periodic 
maintenance requirements. 
o Delays associated with discovering unexpected corrosion and related 
issues, waiting for parts, etc. 
o Actual times needed for inspections once USVs are operational, to acquire 
accurate values of how quickly the cycle runs in calendar time. 
o maintenance manpower and equipment requirements of USV operations 
• optimal use of forklifts and cranes to maximize the speed of payload installation 
and offloading 
• certification of USV CCS operators and maintenance personnel (time and cost) 
• Logistics requirements for USV and basing plan 
• How, or if, the Navy will conduct O, I and depot level maintenance on the USV 
• Current ships lack large and small equipment such as specialized tools, test 
equipment, and an overhead crane. What is the status for the USV? 
 
Pre-deployment	Checks	




• Does the UOC ICS provide the operators the ability to plan, initiate, and monitor 
USV Platform ICS engagements?  
• Does the UOC ICS make engagement data available to the USV ICS in support of 
engagements? 




• What are the procedures to load/off-load containerized payloads? 
 
Training	
• What is the plan to retain the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to operate 
and maintain USVs and ashore and afloat control nodes? 
• What is the status of the USV training pipeline? 
• What is the status of the UOC watch stander training program? 
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o Does it include the following? 
§ USV mission planning/navigation 
§ Payloads monitoring 
§ engineering monitoring 
§ special evolutions teams 
§ manned operations teams 
§ maintenance personnel 
• Do the control node watch standers go through individual, unit, and fleet 
operations training? 
o Does the individual training begin with classroom instruction and consist 
of: 
§ fundamentals of the platforms and specific watch station 
requirements 
§ training simulator in order to practice their watch station.  
§ real world watches under qualified instruction before receiving 
their qualification.  
o Does unit level training include watch teams operating the live USVs? 
o Does fleet operations training include USV participation in exercises with 
fleet assets? 
 
• Is the navigation/mission planning watch qualification an NEC accredited 
course? 
• Is the maintenance qualification an NEC accredited course? 
• Is follow-on and refresher training computer-based that includes simulators of 
operations? 
• Is training is conducted at the warfare center that is the core support center for the 
specific system or at the appropriate training center? 
• Do ships that work with USVs have the required number of NEC qualified 
individuals with up-to-date training to stand as their USV watch team (very 
similar to an ASTAC qualification)?  
 
• Does the UOC watch team training consist of USV Navigation/Mission Planning, 
Payload Operations, and Engineering Monitoring? 
 
• Does USV Navigation/Mission Planning consist of planning missions and sending 
them to the USV, monitoring the USV during operations, and providing over 
watch for all navigation and reporting requirements? 
 
• Does the Payload Operations watch team training consist of: 
o the applicable rates and qualifications for the specific payload? 
o being responsible for the operation and monitoring of the payloads? 
 
• Does the Engineering Monitor training consist of monitoring the engineering 
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• If manned for force protection are personnel trained to operate weapons systems 




• Are specific RE and Certification Exercises CE for crew on board USV while 
underway or at Sea and Anchor detail defined in the Surface Force Training and 
Readiness Manual (SFTRM).  
• Are the following examples of likely RE and CEs used? 
o MOB-N 
§ RE-01 ASA Checksheet 
§ RE-03 Conduct restricted waters navigation 
§ RE-06 Respond to loss of primary sensor and loss of primary 
display 
§ RE-07 Conduct Open Ocean Navigation  
§ RE-08 Respond to steering casualty 
§ RE-10 Respond to GPS Denial/EMI or Navigational Systems. 
o MOB-S 
§ RE-01 ASA Checksheet 
§ RE-02 Conduct Underway from or mooring to a pier 
§ RE-07 Conduct MOB recovery (Day and Night) 
§ RE-03 (CE-04) Conduct Anchoring Operations  
o Specific RE and CE for Crew on board USV while in port Pier side  
§ MOB-D 
• RE-01 ASA Checksheet, RE-02 Set Material Condition 
Readiness RE-05 Respond to Flooding 
§ AT  
• RE 01-09 in conjunction with ISIC, Control Ship, Host 
Nation (if operating overseas). 
o REs and CEs to be accomplished by ISIC, Control Ship or UOC Ashore 
§ COMMS:  
• RE-01 ASA Checksheet 
• RE-02 Demonstrate RF OPS for HF/UHF 
• RE-03 Demonstrate UHF SATCOM OPS 
• RE-04 Demonstrate SAT SHF/EHF OPS 
• RE-06 Demonstrate communications casualty response 
procedures 
• RE-07 Implement U/W communications plan 
§ CYBER 
• RE-01 ASA Checksheet 
• RE-02 Review Cyberspace Security Workforce (CSWF) 
Program 
• RE-03 Verify Traditional Security Compliance 
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• RE-01 ASA Checksheet 
• RE-05 Conduct watch standers brief 
• RE-06 Demonstrate Intelligence Collection and Reporting 
• RE-08 Demonstrate Visual Information Reporting 
§ STW 
• RE-01 ASA Checksheet 
• RE-03 Preform Complex Missile Exercise 
• R-05 Conduct Mission Data Update (MDU) via installed 
paths 
§ SW 
• RE-01 ASA Checksheet 
• RE-02 Conduct Surface Engagement 
• RE-08 Conduct GCCS Data Base Management 
§ ASW 
• RE-02 Conduct Torpedo Evasion 
 
Vessel	Retrieval	and	Scuttle	
• Is required equipment for towing located aboard the USV? 
• Is a method of tracking the USV both electronically and visually integrated into 
the vessel to identify it as a hazard when needed to navigation until such time as it 
may be recovered? 
• Scuttling 
o Is there an encrypted, line of sight method for remote scuttling? 
o Is there a manual system of scuttling that would allow a boarding party to 
perform the task? 
 
Habitability (logistics and sustainment for detachment of temporary crew) 
• For USVs without accommodations for crew to be aboard for extended periods of 
time 
o Less than 12 hours. Are procedures in place to ensure embarking crews 
have sufficient supplies? 
§ Potable water 
§ Meals, ready to eat (MREs) 
§ Basic first aid 
§ PPE 
§ Tools for required work 
§ Crew relief 
§ Life rafts (unless moored alongside a RHIB) {SAFETY} 
• For USVs with accommodations for crew. 
o More than 12 hours. Are procedures in place to for embarking crews? 
§ Exposure to weather, sea state changes, hygiene 
§ Potable water storage 
§ Modular berthing 









Has the USV’s ISIC appointed a supply officer to fulfill the roles and responsibilities for 
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Findings	and	Recommendations	
 
• “After promulgation, the MUSV and LUSV CONOP will provide the core 
methodology and approach for COMUSFLTFORCOM and COMUSPACFLT 
claimancies to address strengthening MUSV and LUSV capabilities at the operational 
and tactical levels. The CONOP may continue to be updated as required in order to 
address future innovations and capabilities in the fleet” [USFF]. 
 
• Maintain the core of the CONOPS Development Team and meet annually to 
periodically review and refine the checklist and recommendations and update as 
required. 
 
• Use of simulation tools such as AVIA (used by LT Anderson and LT Oberholtzer in 
their thesis) can be of significant utility in the area of COLREGS testing and 
compliance. The LTs found several instances where Sea Hunter would not maneuver 
in accordance with COLREGS. 
 
• An additional checklist to include items at the SECRET/NOFORN level could be an 
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Appendix	A.	Acronyms	
 
ABS  American Bureau of Shipping 
ABS HSNC American Bureau of Shipping High Speed Naval Craft 
AIS  Automatic Identification System 
ASA  Afloat-Self Assessment 
ASTAC Anti-Submarine/Anti-Surface Warfare Tactical Air Controller 
AVIA  Autonomy, Validation, Introspection, and Assessment 
BA  battlespace awareness 
BLOS  beyond line-of-sight 
C2  command and control 
C3S  C2 and communications suite 
C4I  C2, communications, computers, and intelligence 
CAPT  Captain 
CCS  common control system 
CDT  CONOPS Development Team 
CE  certification exercise 
CG  guided missile cruiser 
CNSP  Commander, Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific 
CO  Communications Operations (Autonomy Software Service) 
COG  course over ground 
COLREGS  collision regulations or International Rules of the Road 
COMDTINST   Commandant Instruction (USCG) 
COMUSFLTFORCOM Commander, US Fleet Forces Command 
COMUSPACFLT  Commander, US Pacific Fleet 
CONOPS concept of operations 
CONUS contiguous United States 
COP  common operational picture 
COVID-19 Corona Virus Disease-2019 
CSWF  Cyberspace Security Workforce 
C-TEM Containerized Tethered Elevated Mast 
D2E2  denied, degraded, or exploitable environment 
DCO-IDM Defensive Cyber Operations-Internal Defensive Measures 
DDG  guided missile destroyer 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DOTMLPF-P  doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,  
personnel, facilities, and policy 
Dr.  Doctor 
EHF  extremely high frequency 
EKMS  electronic key management system 
EMI  electromagnetic interference 
EO  Engineering Operations (Autonomy Software Service) 
EW  electronic warfare 
FOUO  for official use only 
GCCS  Global Command and Control System 
GFE  government furnished equipment 
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GPS  Global Positioning System 
GTRI  Georgia Tech Research Institute 
HF  high frequency 
HFIP  high frequency internet protocol 
HSS  high sea state 
ICS  integrated combat system 
I-level  Intermediate-level 
IMO  International Maritime Organization 
INS  inertial navigation system 
IOC  initial operating capability 
ISIC  immediate superior in command 
ISR  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
ISR&T ISR and targeting 
KEYMAT keying material 
LAN  local area network 
LOS  line-of-sight 
LT  Lieutenant 
LWH  loiter with heading 
M  meters 
MDU  mission data update 
M/LUSV  medium and large USV 
MM  Mission Management (Autonomy Software Service) 
MO  Maneuver Operations (Autonomy Software Service) 
MOB-D mobility-damage control 
MOB-N mobility-navigation 
MOB-S mobility-seamanship 
MREs  meals, ready to eat 
MUSV  medium unmanned surface vehicle 
NCTAMS naval computer and telecommunications area master station 
NCTS  naval computer and telecommunications station 
NEC  Navy enlisted classification (code) 
nm  nautical miles 
NOFORN no foreign nationals 
NRP  Naval Research Project 
OCONUS outside the contiguous United States 
O-level Operational-level 
OPAREA operational area 
OPS  operations 
PMS 406 Unmanned Maritime Systems Program Office 
PNT  positioning, navigation, and timing 
PPE  personal protective equipment 
PS  physical security 
PUK  pack-up kit 
RAS  replenishment at sea 
RC2  resilient command and control 
RE  repetitive exercise 
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RHIB  rigid hull, inflatable boat 
SA  situational awareness 
SATCOM satellite communications 
SCEP  Surface Capability Evolution Plan 
SEM  Sensor/Effector Management EO (Autonomy Software Service) 
SFTRM Surface Force Training and Readiness Manual 
SHF  superhigh frequency 
SIL  systems integration laboratory 
SOG  speed over ground 
SS  sea state 
TTNT  Tactical Targeting Network Technology 
TTP  tactics, techniques, and procedures 
UHF  ultrahigh frequency 
UMS  unmanned maritime systems 
UNCLAS unclassified 
UNREP underway replenishment 
UOC  USV operations center (ashore or afloat) 
US or U.S. United States 
USCG  United States Coast Guard 
USFF  United States Fleet Forces Command 
USN  United States Navy 
USV  unmanned surface vessel 
U/W  underway 
VLS  vertical launch system 
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Appendix	B.	Thesis	(Anderson	and	Oberholtzer)-separate	
document	
 
